The Organization of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS) stands as a beacon of deeper and more effective regional integration in the Caribbean, boasting a level of unity and cooperation that many argue surpasses that of the Caribbean Community (CARICOM). Since its founding in 1973, CARICOM has struggled to fully realize its objectives, and among its members, the OECS countries have persistently borne the greatest disadvantages—receiving a disproportionately smaller share of the benefits and facing structural imbalances that undermine their development. In contrast, the OECS has forged a more complete union, featuring a common currency, freedom of movement without work permits, a shared judicial system, and coordinated economic policies. Given these tangible advancements, it is reasonable to question why OECS members should continue to accept existing CARICOM arrangements that marginalize their voices and hinder their progress. Allen Chastanet’s recent call for the OECS to consider withdrawing from CARICOM is not merely a provocative suggestion but a necessary challenge to the status quo—one that demands the region confront the urgent need for equitable treatment and meaningful integration.
Chastanet’s critique is grounded in the lived realities of OECS states. Despite being full and sovereign members of CARICOM, these countries frequently find themselves sidelined in decision-making processes and deprived of equitable benefits. Persistent trade imbalances and structural disadvantages leave OECS economies vulnerable and overly dependent on imports. CARICOM’s well- documented “implementation deficit”—its inability to enforce agreements effectively—means that many commitments remain mere words on paper. Repeated calls from OECS leaders for fair treatment and compensatory mechanisms have largely been ignored, breeding frustration and skepticism about the value of continued participation.
What makes Chastanet’s concerns all the more compelling is that they are echoed by other prominent OECS leaders. Prime Ministers Gaston Browne of Antigua and Barbuda and Ralph Gonsalves of St. Vincent and the Grenadines have voiced similar frustrations. Browne has spoken openly about the “benign neglect” that OECS members endure within CARICOM, while Gonsalves highlights the failure to implement provisions designed to support disadvantaged countries, pointing to tariff structures that favor larger economies like Trinidad and Tobago, thereby stifling OECS competitiveness. Both have called for meaningful compensatory measures and expressed disappointment over the failure of larger members to meet their financial obligations to the CARICOM Development Fund, intended to assist less developed states.
Despite holding six votes collectively within CARICOM—a significant voice—the OECS members receive benefits disproportionately skewed against them. This paradox underscores a fundamental imbalance: formal voting power does not translate into equitable influence or fair distribution of regional gains. The OECS has, in fact, developed a far more integrated and functional regional framework than CARICOM itself. Its members share a common currency—the Eastern Caribbean dollar—enjoy freedom of movement without work permits, benefit from mutual recognition of driver’s licenses, and are served by a shared supranational judiciary, the Eastern Caribbean Supreme Court. In contrast, CARICOM still lacks a common currency and a unified civil aviation authority.
Larger members like Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago disproportionately benefit from shared resources such as airline fees, without equitable redistribution. This structural imbalance explains why smaller OECS states feel marginalized despite their formal status within CARICOM.
It Is important, however, to acknowledge that some of the sharp criticism directed at Chastanet— particularly from Gonsalves—may stem as much from political rivalry and personal differences as from substantive disagreement with his message. Chastanet’s center-right political orientation and leadership style contrast with the labor-oriented, left-leaning backgrounds of many OECS leaders, influencing how his proposals are received. Yet, the core issues he raises about marginalization and structural imbalance resonate widely, indicating that the criticism sometimes targets the messenger more than the message itself.
Chastanet’s call for the OECS to seriously consider withdrawing from CARICOM is not an impulsive reaction but a strategic move designed to shake the status quo. By putting withdrawal on the table, he forces CARICOM to confront its shortcomings directly. Sometimes, the threat of fragmentation is the only way to compel meaningful reform and ensure that smaller states are no longer overlooked. Additionally, exploring bilateral agreements with larger member states could empower OECS countries to negotiate terms better suited to their unique needs, rather than being constrained by a one-size-fits-all framework that disproportionately benefits the powerful.
After decades of unfulfilled promises and stalled reforms, it is clear that continuing to participate in a system that consistently disadvantages OECS states only perpetuates inequality. Withdrawal is not a panacea, but neither is complacency. Chastanet’s bold stance highlights the urgent need for CARICOM to address its structural imbalances, enforce its agreements, and deliver tangible benefits to all members—not just the largest economies.
In challenging the regional orthodoxy, Allen Chastanet offers a necessary and courageous perspective. His critique resonates deeply with the lived experiences of OECS states and finds support, albeit more cautiously, among other regional leaders. The time has come for OECS countries to demand more than empty rhetoric and symbolic gestures. Whether through withdrawal or determined reform, the message is clear: the era of benign neglect must end, and Caribbean integration must finally become inclusive, effective, and equitable for all.