Three Terms In A Row For P.M.

Constitution Commission Report.

NO person will be appointed Prime Minister of St Lucia for more than three consecutive five year terms, the Constitutional Reform Commission has recommended.

Today, THE VOICE continues serializing Chapter 6 of the Commission’s report which is subtitled CREATING A HYBRID EXECUTIVE:

After considering whether to retain the Parliamentary system or whether to embrace the Executive Presidential model, the Commission was of the view that a hybrid parliamentary-presidential model should be considered for reasons outlined above.

The parliamentary model only works when the Executive can dominate Parliament. A presidential model can function with different parties controlling the executive branch and the legislative branch of Government or one party may control both with the concurrence of the electorate.

The key factor here is that both the fixed dates for elections and the proposal for term limits are features of presidential models of Government and are not features of parliamentary systems, unless there is some kind of compromise.

For example, Canada introduced fixed dates for elections by amending its electoral laws in May 2007; however, the amendment to the electoral law provided for an exception to the powers of the Governor-General under the Royal Prerogative (in order to avoid having to seek a constitutional amendment). Accordingly, the revised electoral law provided that a general election should be held at the federal level on the third Monday in October after the previous general election had been held. This established that the next general election ought to have been held on 19th October, 2009.

In September 2008, Prime Minister Stephen Harper, whose government was surviving a number of confidence votes in the Canadian House of Commons because of opposition abstention to avoid forcing a general election, was able to secure a dissolution of parliament in defiance of the electoral laws because the Governor General, Michaelle Jean, exercised the prerogative powers of the Crown to dissolve Parliament in 2008 one year ahead of the fixed date prescribed in electoral law which is inferior in the face of the prerogative powers of the Crown.

The proposal for term limits for the Prime Minister is fashioned after the Twenty-Second (22nd) Amendment to the United States Constitution that was ratified in 1951. The Amendment read as follows :

“Section 1. No person shall be elected to the office of the President more than twice, and no person who has held the office of President, or acted as President, for more than two years of a term to which some other person was elected President shall be elected to the office of the President more than once. But this article shall not apply to any person holding the office of President when this article was proposed by the Congress, and shall not prevent any person who may be holding the office of President, or acting as President, during the term within which this article becomes operative from holding the office of President or acting as President during the remainder of such term.

Section 2. This article shall be inoperative unless it shall have been ratified as an amendment to the Constitution by the legislatures of three-fourths of the several States within seven years from the date of its submission to the States by the Congress.”

The amendment did not apply to the person holding office at the time of its approval, but would apply to future holders of the office of President. This amendment came into effect while President Harry Truman was in office but he did not seek to be elected for a third term after the New Hampshire primary in 1952.

Setting aside the example of Canada, the Commission recognises that fixed dates for elections in Parliamentary systems were not normal due to the problem that in the event of a crisis, (as occurred in Saint Lucia during the 1979 – 1982 period) the life of a government may need to be ended prematurely. In short, the Commission recognised that one of the strengths of the Parliamentary system was the flexibility it allowed to end the Parliament earlier where circumstances arose which makes this desirable. Accordingly, if dates for elections were fixed a problem could arise where a government may need to return to the polls, due to a loss of confidence for example, earlier than the typical five (5) year anniversary. Having considered the issue at length, the Commission decided to address this issue with fixed dates for elections by retaining the current provisions of Section 55 (4) (a) & (b) of the Constitution to ensure some degree of flexibility to avert possible constitutional crises.

In a parliamentary system, the appointment of the Prime Minister is not determined by the people, but rather by the Head of State based on constitutional guidelines. In these circumstances, the Commission has determined that it will recommend that any appointment to the office of Prime Minister continue to be made as it is now, with the President replacing the Governor General.

In the Commonwealth Caribbean, there are written constitutions that regulate the manner in which the Prime Minister is to be appointed. These constitutions may be separated into different methods as regards the appointment, and termination of appointment, of a Prime Minister. One method emphasises the incumbency theory by making provision for the removal of the Prime Minister only if the changes in the membership of the elected House, after a dissolution and before the first sitting of Parliament, are such that the Governor-General or President, as the case may be, determines that it is necessary to remove the Prime Minister from office. Otherwise, the Prime Minister does not have to be re-appointed if he/she continues to command the support of a majority of elected members after a general election. Commonwealth Caribbean countries that follow this method in their constitutions are Dominica, Grenada, St. Christopher and Nevis, Saint Lucia, and St. Vincent and the Grenadines.

Another method emphasises the need for the termination of office regardless of incumbency after a dissolution and before the first sitting of Parliament. In this case, the termination of office comes as a consequence of being re-appointed as Prime Minister so that one term of office ends and another begins for every incumbent. The appointment of someone else as Prime Minister will naturally end the term of the incumbent. However, effect is given to this termination merely by way of the Governor- General or President, as the case may be, informing the incumbent Prime Minister that he/she is to be re-appointed or someone else is to be appointed Prime Minister. Commonwealth Caribbean countries that follow this method are Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, Belize, Jamaica, The Bahamas, and Trinidad and Tobago.

The incumbency method recognises that there is no need to re-appoint the Prime Minister if the alterations in the elected membership of Parliament after a general election do not warrant any change. The termination method makes it mandatory that the Prime Minister vacate office every time after a general election whether the reason is re-appointment or the appointment of someone else.

In Saint Lucia, the Parliaments that assembled after the general elections of 6th April, 1987 and 30th April, 1987 would have created some controversy as Saint Lucia had adopted the incumbency rule where re-appointment of the Prime Minister is not required as opposed to the case of Trinidad and Tobago where the termination method exists. Each term of Parliament in Saint Lucia is not matched by a re-appointment of the Prime Minister thereby negating a term limit rule. In Trinidad and Tobago, a victorious outcome for the incumbent Prime Minister still requires a re-appointment in order to end one term and to start another.

Notwithstanding the above, a majority of the Commission voted in favour of term limits for the Prime Minister of three consecutive five-year terms. A minority however, viewed term limits as being somewhat undemocratic as it fails to take into consideration the wishes of the people if their desire is for a particular person to remain in office.

Recommendation
With respect to term limits for the Prime Minister, the Commission recommends the following:
(96) No person should be appointed to the office of Prime Minister for more than three (3) consecutive five (5) year terms. Where a Prime Minister has served for three (3) consecutive terms, he/she may return after a hiatus of five years.
Direct Election of the Prime Minister Excluded from Hybrid The Commission considered and rejected the submission that the Prime Minister should be elected in direct elections. However, it must be noted that this submission was among those with the highest frequency among the submissions that the Commission received.

The Commission was of the view that the recommendation of the direct election of the Prime Minister will lead to the creation of an Executive Presidential system along the lines of the United States. Commissioners did not support the idea of an Executive President, as it was felt that the concept was too radical a deviation from the present system and our political culture may not be ready for such a recommendation.

The prospect of having the Prime Minister being directly elected and the constituencies electing their representatives could create a situation in which the Prime Minister could emerge from a party that won a minority of seats in the House, but capture the premiership in national (and not constituency) elections. This would therefore make it difficult for the Prime Minister to implement the policies of the party to which he/she belonged because the majority in the House of Assembly may be controlled by another party. In a small island developing state like Saint Lucia, this may make governing untenable.

Recommendation
With respect to the election of the Prime Minister, the Commission recommends the following: (97) The status quo in relation to the appointment of the Prime Minister be maintained. There should not be direct election of the Prime Minister.